Introduction
As a small-sized former Soviet republic situated in the Caucasus region, Georgia has managed to attract the attention of the international community in the years after the Rose Revolution of November 2003. It has presented itself as an example of a rapidly modernising country and one of the few post-Soviet states to have effectively succeeded to tackle corruption in various sectors. Georgia has become associated with such labels as a "world's top reformer", a champion of anti-corruption reforms and a "success story" in the post-Soviet space. This image change is all the more impressive since the country was considered a failed state and an example of systemic corruption during the 1990s, under the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze. Georgia has sought to promote the image of a Westernising society, able to turn the back to a Soviet past characterised by corruption and illicit practices.
The police reform took centre stage in the ambitious reform programme launched by the government under the United National Movement party of President Mikheil Saakashvili (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . In particular, the replacement of the old traffic police with a brand-new and non-corrupt patrol police in 2004 was widely hailed as a "success story" and an example of the quick changes that could be achieved through the implementation of bold and radical measures. However, the bright image of the young patrol policeman that has marked the immediate aftermath of the revolution and that symbolised the country's Westernisation was gradually replaced by revelations regarding the surveillance and control practices of lawenforcement agencies (Huter and Andguladze 2012) as well as the scandal of police abuse in prisons. The scandal that broke out in 2012 after videos were released showing acts of torture against prisoners brought to light an entirely different set of practices employed by the lawenforcement agencies than the ones promoted by the community-friendly patrol police. The post-revolutionary period presents us with different sets of practices and registers of behaviour stemming from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the core organ in the Saakashvili's administration that has been described as its "spine" (International Crisis Group 2012: 16) .
The article argues that the transition paradigm, which sees the more repressive aspects in Georgia's police reform as "deviations" from a fully democratic transition path, fails to understand how they are integral to the Georgian government's project of reforming the country and building a "success story" in the post-Soviet space. In order to understand the central role of law-enforcement organs in sustaining this image of success, the gaze needs to be directed not only at the creation of the patrol police -the flagship reform of the Saakashvili's era -, but also at more repressive practices deployed by the police, in particular in the fight against crime. These two aspects of the police reform, that appear at first glance to indicate different trajectories, can be seen as connected if we analyse the reform by focusing on the symbolic and performative dimension of the construction of a new Georgian state. The reform of law-enforcement organs is thus instrumental in projecting the image of a new Georgian state and integral to the particular mode of governance favoured by the Saakashvili's administration that relies on showcasing certain areas of progress, while concealing other social phenomena (Di Puppo 2015) .
The celebration of the construction of a new and efficient state and the association of certain figures and practices to a past Georgia rely on a particular dramaturgy. In the spectacle of law-enforcement agencies fighting against criminals, the efficiency of the state and its capacity to achieve tangible results are accentuated. In their reference to the "spectacle of policing" in post-Apartheid South Africa, Jean and John Comaroff note that the drama that is so integral to policing is "evidence of a desire to condense disperse power in order to make it visible, tangible, accountable, effective" (Comaroffs 2004: 805) . Wacquant (2010) further refers to the "law-and-order guignol" and the dimension of spectacle that appear inherent to policing in the 21 st century as an effort to reaffirm state sovereignty through the privileged and limited domain of law-enforcement. He says: "Everywhere the law-and-order guignol has become a core civic theater onto whose stage elected officials prance to dramatize moral norms and display their professed capacity for decisive action, thereby reaffirming the political relevance of Leviathan at the very moment when they organize its powerlessness with regard to the market" (Wacquant 2010: 206) . Wacquant (2009 Wacquant ( , 2010 further draws the attention to the role of the penal state in the creation of social boundaries. He suggests studying the punitive or coercive arm of the state by recourse to the notion of production, instead of the technical prism of repression. He remarks: "The police, courts and prison are not mere technical implements whereby the authorities respond to crime -as in the commonsensical view fostered by law and criminology -but a core political capacity through which the state both produces and manages inequality, identity and marginality" (Wacquant 2008: 13) .
Drawing on these observations about the role of policing in the 21 st century and of the punitive arm of the state as a producer of social domains and boundaries, I will analyse the police reform through the lens of the creation of symbolic divides between "two Georgias". I
will ask the question of how to reconcile the success story of the creation of the patrol police with more repressive practices employed by police officers by focusing on the particular effects of the reform in terms of drawing boundaries and emphasising contrasts.
Georgia: from the corrupt state to the "reformer"
The Republic of Georgia in the period of the 1990s under the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze (1992 Shevardnadze ( -2003 was typically seen as a failed state characterised by weak state institutions and endemic corruption. This period began with a coup against the first democratically elected President and former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia in January 1992.
A heteroclite alliance composed of members of the old nomenklatura, the Soviet intelligentsia and criminal groups precipitated the fall of the Gamsakhurdia's government.
Indicators such as low tax collection, cross-border smuggling, the lack of territorial control on the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the presence of illegal militia groups in cross-border zones concurred to produce an image of Georgia as a "failed state".
Yet at the same time, Georgia was also regarded for many years as a promising transition country in the post-Soviet space. King captured the country's contradicting image as being simultaneously one of the most corrupt and reform-prone countries with the term "potemkin democracy" (King 2001 (Pearce 2011) . The government has been driven by a belief in the market system as a solution to employment instead of direct public intervention.
However, those fired from public jobs after the revolution have had difficulties finding employment in the private sector (Gugushvili 2011 In what follows, I propose a different lens to study the Georgian police's transformation. I draw the attention to the particularities of the mode of governance favoured by the Georgian elite after the revolution by examining how the post-revolutionary period is characterised by the symbolic work of rendering certain objects and domains (in)visible. Frederiksen (2014) has sought to capture the way in which the new Georgian elite seeked to render certain issues unproblematic (and thus absent) in the present by projecting a future in which they cease to exist through the notion of "would-be-state". Certain phenomena that were associated with revoked times in the form of the Georgia of the 1990s were officially declared as having The city full of lights can be seen as the symbol of a new Georgia, offering a vivid contrast to the "darkness" of the 1990s. The metaphors of "light" and "darkness", that find materialisation in the architectural changes in the capital city, oppose "two Georgias": a bright, new Georgian nation against the Sovietised and corrupt Georgia of the 1990s. This contrast finds a particular echo in a new piece of architecture that was unveiled after the revolution. Shatirishvili (2009: 392) refers to the statue of Saint George that was erected on
Freedom Square in Tbilisi in 2006 as incarnating the narrative of the Rose Revolution. In this visual representation, the dragon pierced by Saint George is a metaphor for the primordial chaos from which a new nation is created. Shatirishvili (2009: 392) observes: "in a certain sense, the Rose Revolution is a "cosmogony", narrating the birth of the new nation and "the mighty Georgian state" from Shevardnadze's chaos". The end of the Shevardnadze's presidency thus marks the act of birth of a "new Georgia". A boundary is drawn between two periods that are associated with sets of opposites: "future" and "past"; "order" and "chaos";
"legality" and "illegality/corruption". The new Georgian state is represented as oriented towards the future and defined by an "irrevocable" rupture with past legacies.
The particularity of the building of a new Georgia is the quick pace of changes and the notion that a new and modern state is not a vision on the horizon, but already exists. The existence of this new Georgia is communicated through rapid reforms that produce immediate results.
The illumination of government buildings that is typical of post-revolutionary Georgia can be understood both as a means of drawing contrasts and as a manifestation of power in the government's capacity to illuminate certain domains, while obscuring others. Frederiksen 
The spectacle of law-and-order: the new state against criminals
In the period following the revolution, Georgian citizens suddenly saw images showing a battle between the state and criminals appear on their television screens. The fight against corruption and crime became an everyday reality through the spectacle of corrupt officials and criminals being arrested on live television. In interviews that I conducted with Georgian representatives of non-governmental organisations engaged in the fight against corruption, interviewees often referred to the broadcasting of arrests and expressed some ambivalent feelings towards them. One Georgian NGO representative related this period in these terms:
"It started with various measures, which were part of anti-corruption initiatives: they were very, how to say, sharp or hard, because they started to put people in prison, to arrest them.
Taking away their property and that kind of thing, they took very aggressive steps. A part of the population liked it, a part was a bit disappointed, because we watched every day how the police arrested former government members and how they put them in prison, all of them.
Each day: two or three big arrests. It was like… In the first couple of months, "oh-oh they are doing something, it's good". But then it continued, and people began to be worried about it." The broadcasting of arrests live on television after the revolution can be seen as a means of communicating to the wide public the existence of a new Georgian state that is able to punish corrupt officials and criminals and by doing so, clearly draw the lines between a civic community and new "outlaws". This new dramaturgy that opposes law-enforcement organs and criminals can be understood through the prism of the "spectacle of policing" (Comaroffs 2004) as an effort to stage and enhance state authority and accentuate its effectiveness.
The spectacle of policing allows for the fictional entity that is the state to become visible and tangible as well as endowing it with some mythical qualities of omnipresence. The fear of punishment became an everyday reality for a number of Georgian citizens. As a Georgian expert, who also held a public position in the Saakashvili's administration, explained on the arrests: "It works. I understand that some people complain that it is a violation of human rights, cameras filming punishment.
[…] But in a Soviet style society, very traditional society, The spectacle of a battle between the new state and criminals also served to give a face to the old Georgia of the 1990s as embodying corrupt practices that did not belong to a new society.
The "thieves-in-law" as professional criminals with roots in Soviet Georgia became a quasimythical figure and a new privileged target as the face of the old Georgia. As noted by Slade (2013) in his study of the fight against organised crime after the revolution, the organisation of the "thieves-in-law" was vulnerable and disorganised and had already lost its power of resistance prior to the state attacks launched by the Saakashvili's government. Frederiksen (2015) further refers to the "thieves-in-law" as "scapegoats" and notes about a former thief:
"Levan and his kind became scapegoats for a principle that could only be eradicated figuratively" (Frederiksen 2015: 166) . The thieves' "disappearance" thus stood for the elimination of corruption and criminality and for the consolidation of a symbolic divide between the state as the guarantor of law-and-order and the criminal world even if, as observed by Frederiksen (2015) , the practices they represented may have persisted. This as standing for the elimination of criminality, the removal of these agencies, particularly the traffic police, were presented as signifying the end of bribery practices. after the revolution revealed that the Georgian government was reluctant to take this step (Di Puppo 2014). A representative of an international organisation explained that government officials were in favour of naming the strategy a "good governance strategy": "The supporters of this idea were against using the term corruption, because if you are saying "anticorruption", it means that there is widespread corruption and there is no widespread corruption anymore, so it is better to call it "good governance strategy" from that point of view. Because "good governance" means also elimination of corruption. They [government officials] were against using "anti-corruption" as if corruption was as widespread as during the Shevardnadze's government." 15 The reluctance to adopt an anti-corruption strategy can be explained by the fact that it would contradict the notion that corruption had ceased to be a problem after the revolution.
The divide between "future" and "past" had as a consequence the representation of certain groups of the population such as the old intelligentsia and older employees in government agencies as belonging to revoked times. 16 Old public officials were seen as inherently corrupt in another comment by the high official in the Civil Registry: "It was just impossible to work with people who have a very different mentality and they were all the time looking for money, how to earn money, they were really corrupt; not only, they were mentally corrupt people."
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Mikheil Saakashvili referred to the risk of exclusion for those not ready to embrace rapid changes by commenting on the opposition in 2007: "They want to catch the train, which has already departed and which is already so far away that it is even impossible to catch it even with a Formula 1 car" (Civil Georgia 2007).
The replacement of old policemen by new and younger ones allowed to metaphorically expert, close to government circles, noted the importance of advertising reforms: "Some companies produce good computers, one thing is how it is engineered and another thing how it is marketed, you need both. We need to sell all these policies, not just on the judgment of future scholars, we need to sell it to the decision makers who sit in Brussels." 20 The removal of the old traffic police allowed achieving an immediate visibility of reforms by removing "obvious" signs of corruption. It can also be seen as a less costly reform. For example, the criminal police did not experience the same dramatic changes, as revamping the agency would have caused the loss of an invaluable knowledge of criminal networks. other kinds of supporters -know that whatever they do, we will anyway establish order and people will feel safe and business will be launched without any threat of racketeering… our streets will be cleansed of this criminal rubbish through the protection of all laws and principles of democracy" (Civil Georgia 2006) . He outlined a new policy: "We have announced a policy of zero tolerance and we should continue this policy, we should put everyone in jail in accordance with the law and we should amend the criminal procedure code so that no one can be released through conditional sentences […] So we will amend this criminals and a zero-tolerance policy resulted in the disappearance of "obvious" signs of a past period in the form of street-level bribery, petty crime and "thieves-in-law". The space of the streets as the space of daily encounters between citizens and officials was cleared off of these practices. Saakashvili's speech shows how this process was concomitant with the creation of another space, the "invisible space of the prison", as he says "our streets will be cleansed of this criminal rubbish" and "we should put everyone in jail".
If we come back to the notion of the government's capacity to switch on and off the light on certain areas as an expression of power, we observe that reduced crime rates and the disappearance of police bribery and of "thieves-in-law" allowed showcasing a new Georgia.
The light was instead switched off in areas such as the prison that became "invisible spaces". 27 The first Interior Minister after the revolution, Giorgi Baramidze, used a war-like rhetoric at the start of his mandate to describe the fight against criminals: "God has now given us this chance, to fight not on the frontline, but in sitting in warm offices. But we have to realize this is a real war" and "We should not wait until somebody invades us to prove we are patriots" (Stier 2003) . 28 See Ditrych (2010) on the reference to the concept of "state of exception" in contemporary Georgian politics and under the Saakashvili's government.
The release of videos recording acts of police abuse against prisoners before the parliamentary elections of October 2012 eventually brought to light the "dark" space of the prison. The "invisible people" (Slade 2012 ) that had populated this space came back into view through the revelation of acts of torture, abuse and humiliation performed against them.
The scandal and the pre-elections' period also revealed the widespread surveillance and control activities that were performed by the Interior Ministry's Constitutional Security Department and Special Operations Department (SOD) (Huter and Andguladze 2012) . A logic of surveillance had increasingly pervaded the whole of Georgian society. The reliance on surveillance can be interpreted as an extension of the notion of "legal lawlessness" and of the space of prison itself to larger segments of the population under the justification of protecting the country's national security. As a further indication of the spread of the logic of crime control and surveillance to whole segments of society, approaches borrowed from the criminal justice sector were applied to the Georgian school environment (Slade and Tangiashvili 2013) .
Conclusion
The study aimed to analyse the central role of the law-enforcement domain in the symbolic construction of a new Georgian state after the revolution. The question underlying the analysis was of how to reconcile different sets of practices used by law-enforcement organs:
the non-corrupt and community-friendly patrol police and surveillance or more repressive methods employed by police officers. The study argues that the more problematic aspects of the police reform should not be viewed through the prism of the transition paradigm as "deficiencies" and "setbacks" in an overall success story of reform or as "deviances" on the path towards a Western market democracy. Instead, the mode of governance that underlies the reform can be understood as making use of and replicating the symbolic divides that are produced by the transition discourse. This discourse has the effect of associating Soviet practices with a past that needs to be overcome, thus castigating negative phenomena such as corruption as belonging exclusively to revoked times. In the transition language, corruption is systematically understood as a sign of incomplete or deficient transition, a failure to attain the promises of the Western democratic model. As noted by Kalb (2015: 20) , corruption has been construed as a "local fact" and local failure, flaw or deficiency in the Western liberal democratic discourse on post-communist states. The transition paradigm thus portrays the Western democratic model as being devoid of any "dysfunctions" and relegates to a problematic past phenomena such as bribery and weak state institutions unable to control crime. It enforces a strict divide between a dysfunctional past and a bright future with a period of transition understood as being potentially characterised by "setbacks".
In this light, the efforts of the new Georgian elite to "clean" spaces in the public eye from traces of crime and corruption as standing for a dysfunctional past can be interpreted as a forceful attempt to showcase how a new everyday reality is already taking shape. The need to attain immediate results and cast light on them can be understood precisely as espousing the transition discourse, whereby the Soviet past needs to be revoked and "disappear" in the 
